State of Utah v. Marie S. McKinnon : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
State of Utah v. Marie S. McKinnon : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert R. Wallace; Lisa Watts Baskin; Plant, Wallace, Christensen and Kanell; Counsel for Appellee.
Christopher D. Ballard; Colin R. Winchester; Assistant Attorneys General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah
Attorney General; Counsel for Appellant .
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. McKinnon, No. 20010790 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3491
I1" III! "I \ l l i OURT OF APPEALS 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
MARIE S. MCK ••. 
Anpellee. 
Case No. lu\)\\\ .'«>i• -<. A 
imil l ' , MM 1 "' 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM IHt DISMISSAL Ot A CHARGL Ui t A L S L 
NOTARIAL CERTIFICATION, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR, IN THL 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, THE 
HONORABLE BEN H. HADFIELD PRESIDING 
ROBERT R. WALL A 
LISA WATTS BASKIN 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801)363-7611 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD (M"'» 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER (4<>%) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City. UT 84114-i/N-4 
(801)366-- -
Counsel for Appellee Counsel fpjr^sgeyant 
Utah Court of AopsaJs 
JAN
 2 0 2002 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 3 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
SECTION 76-1-303 DID NOT EXTEND THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS 4 
A. The trial court correctly ruled that the plain language 
of section 76-1-303 does not require the State to discover 
the offense after the original limitations period expires 5 
B. The trial court erred by imposing upon section 76-1-303 
the requirement that discovery of the offense occur after 
the expiration of the original limitations period 9 
C. The State Timely Filed the Information in This Case 14 
CONCLUSION 15 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A - Utah Code Ann. §§ 46-1-9 (1998), 76-1-302 (1999), 
and 76-1-303 (1999). 
Addendum B - Trial Court's Ruling. R. 85-88. 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Associated Gen. Contractors v. Board of Oil Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, 
437 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 9, 10, 13 
Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Rees, 668 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983) 11 
Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Const. Co., 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987) 11 
Brixen & Christopher Architects, P.C v. State, 2001 UT App. 210, 29 P.3d 650 8 
Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235 (Utah 1998) 11 
Horn v. Utah Department of Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 11 
J.J.W.v. State, 2001 UT App. 271, 33 P.3d 59 5 
Macris v. Sculptured Software. Inc., 2001 UT 43, 24 P.3d 984 11 
Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981) 10, 12 
O'Neal v. Division of Family Service, 821 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1991) 10, 11, 12, 13 
People v. McGreal, 278 N.E.2d 504 (111. App. Ct. 1971) 7 
State v. Holland, 781 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) 7 
State v. Lester, 676 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) 7 
State v. Mast, 2001 UT App. 402, 437 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 1 
State v. Wilson, 573 N.W.2d 248 (Iowa 1998) 7,8 
Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1995) 11 
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992) 11 
ii 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 46-1-9 (1998) 2 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-302(1999) 5,7, 13. 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-303 (1999) passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1 (1999) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 2001) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-19 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-27 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 12 
OTHER WORK CITED 
Model Penal Code and Commentaries, § 1.06 7 
in 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
MARIE S. MCKINNON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20010790-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The State appeals from an order dismissing a charge of false notarial certification, 
a class B misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-
18a-l(2)(a) (1999), and 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the statute extending the limitations period for criminal offenses 
involving fraud or breach of fiduciary obligation applies when the State discovers the 
offense before the original limitations period expires? 
Standard of review: Because "the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of 
law," this Court will "accord no deference to the legal conclusions of the district court but 
[will] review them for correctness." State v. Mast, 2001 UT App. 402, f 7, 437 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 27 (quoting Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,1f 17, 977 P.2d 1201). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following provisions, whose 
text is reproduced in addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-1-9 (1998), 76-1-302, and 76-1-303 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one count of false notarial certification, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-1-9 (1998). R. 1-2. Defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss with prejudice, arguing that the prosecution was barred by the statute of 
limitations. R. 16-39. The State opposed the motion on the grounds that UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-1-303 extended the statute of limitations an additional one year from the 
discovery of the offense. R. 40-56. The trial court ruled that section 76-1-303 did not 
apply because the State discovered the offense before the expiration of the original 
limitations period. R. 85-89. The trial court then dismissed the case with prejudice. R. 
90-91. The State timely appealed. R. 93-94. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As a commissioned notary public, defendant notarized four quit-claim deeds 
signed by various signatories between February 12 and March 30 of 1999. R. 41, 51-54, 
80. Rather than executing an independent notarial certification each time someone 
signed a deed, defendant executed an inclusive notarial certification on each of the deeds 
on 30 March 1999. R. 41, 51-54. 
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After the deeds were recorded and scanned, they were returned to the individual 
signatones via mail on or about 14 ^pnl 1999 R 41, 56 After the deeds were returned 
to the signatones, some of the signatones began to question what appeared to be 
counterfeit signatures R 32, 35-36, 42 Between June 30 and August 3 of 2000, an 
investigator with the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing interviewed 
the vanous signatones and learned that defendant was not present when any of them 
signed the deeds R 19-20, 29-30, 32-33, 35-37, 42 The investigator also submitted 
two of the deeds to a forensic document examiner R 21, 42 On 13 October 2000 the 
document examiner issued a report opining that some of the signatures on the deeds were 
forged Id 
The general two-year statute of limitations for the filing of a misdemeanor 
information expired on 30 March 2001 R 18, 42 The information was filed 16 April 
2001, seventeen days after the onginal limitations penod expired R 1-2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State agrees with the trial court's ruling that the plain language of section 76-
1-303 extends the statute of limitations for offenses involving fraud or breach of fiduciary 
duty, even when the offense is discovered before the onginal limitations penod expires 
Interpreting the statute to apply only when the offense is discovered after the onginal 
limitations penod expires produces an absurd result Under that interpretation, the State 
could not prosecute an offense discovered too close to the expiration of the onginal 
limitations penod to investigate and file the case, but could prosecute an offense 
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discovered the day after the limitations period expired. Courts should interpret a statute 
to avoid absurd results. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that the plain 
language of section 76-1-303 did not require that the State discover the offense after the 
original limitations period expired. 
The trial court erred, however, in holding that it could impose such a requirement 
upon the statute, in spite of the plain language to the contrary. A court cannot infer 
substantive terms into a statute that are not already there. Recognizing the absurdity of 
barring the State from prosecuting an offense, simply because it discovered it one day too 
early, the Legislature chose not to make section 76-1-303 applicable only when the 
offense is discovered after the expiration of the original limitations period. The trial court 
therefore erred when it imposed a requirement upon the statute that the Legislature 
purposely omitted. 
Applying the plain language of section 76-1-303, the State timely filed the 
information in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 
76-1-303 DID NOT EXTEND THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS 
The trial court ruled that section 76-1-303 did not "require the State to discover the 
offense after the expiration of the limitation period." R. 87. The State agrees. The trial 
court then ruled, however, that "[e]ven though section 303 may not, by its own terms, 
require the State to discover the offense after the expiration of the general limitation 
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period, the courts may impose a similar requirement." R. 87-88. In so ruling, the trial 
court imposed upon section 76-1-303 a substantive requirement that does not appear in 
the statute. That ruling is erroneous. 
A. The trial court correctly ruled that the plain 
language of section 76-1-303 does not require the 
State to discover the offense after the original 
limitations period expires. 
Section 76-1-303 extends the general criminal statute of limitations, found in 
section 76-1-302, when a crime involves fraud or a breach of fiduciary duty. UTAH CODE 
ANN. §76-1-303(1999). It provides: 
(1) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-302 has expired, a prosecution 
may be commenced for any offense a material element of which is either 
fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation within one year after discovery of 
the offense by an aggrieved party or by a person who has a legal duty to 
represent an aggrieved party and who is himself not a party to the offense. 
(2) Subsection (1) may not extend the period of limitation as provided in 
Section 76-1-302 by more than three years. 
Id. 
The trial court correctly ruled that section 76-1-303 applies, even when the offense 
is discovered prior to the expiration of the original limitations period. R. 87. The plain 
language of the statute does not limit its applicability to cases where the offense is 
discovered only after the original limitations period expires. Id; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
1-303(1999). 
When faced with a question of statutory construction, this Court will 'look first to 
the plain language of the statute." J J. W. v. State, 2001 UT App. 271, \ 17, 33 P.3d 59 
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(quoting Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 2001 UT 29, U 12, 24 P.3d 928). This Court 
will also "presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each 
term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Id. However, it "will not infer 
substantive terms into the text that are not already there." Id. 
The plain language of section 76-1-303 does not require discovery of the offense 
to occur after the expiration of the original limitations period. The statute has three 
conditions that must be satisfied before it can be applied to extend the original statute of 
limitations for criminal offenses. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-303(1) (1999). The 
timing of the discovery of the offense is not one of these requirements. Rather, the statute 
first requires that the original limitations period expire. Id. Second, the prosecution must 
then be commenced "within one year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party 
or by a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and who is himself not 
a party to the offense." Id. Finally, fraud, or breach of fiduciary obligation must be a 
material element of the offense for which the limitations period is being extended. Id. 
Thus, while the statute clearly applies when an offense is discovered after the expiration 
of the original limitations period, the applicability of the statute is not exclusively limited 
to that situation. See id. 
The statute would have to be rewritten if its application was to be limited to cases 
in which an offense is discovered only after the expiration of the original limitations 
period. For example, the statute would have to read: 
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A prosecution may be commenced for any offense, a matenal element of 
v\hich )s either fraud of a breach of fiduciary obligation, within one year 
after discovery of the offense by an aggneved party or by a person who has 
a legal duty to represent an aggneved party and who is himself not a party 
to the offense, provided the offense was discovered after the period 
prescribed in section 76-1-302 has expired 
Because statute does not include the emphasized language, the tnal court correctly 
concluded that section 76-1-303 does not "require the State to discover the offense after 
the expiration of the general limitation penod " R 87. 
Other states that have interpreted statutes that are substantively identical to Utah's 
section 76-1-303, agree that the statute applies whether the offense is discovered before 
or after the expiration of the ongmal limitations penod l People v McGreal, 278 N.E.2d 
504, 508-09 (111. App. Ct. 1971); State v Wilson, 573 N.W.2d 248, 252-53 (Iowa 1998); 
State v Holland, 781 S.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); State v Lester, 676 
N.E.2d 1270, 1271 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
Section 76-1-303 would produce an absurd result if it only applied when the 
offense is discovered after the expiration of the onginal limitations penod For example, 
the State would be barred from prosecuting a fraud-based offense that it discovered 
within the original limitations penod, but too close to the expiration of the penod to be 
able to investigate, screen, and file the case. In other words, the State would be barred 
from prosecuting an offense discovered on the last day of the two-year limitations penod, 
1
 Utah's section 76-1-303, and the similar statutes in other states, are based on the 
Model Penal Code. See Model Penal Code and Commentanes, § 1.06; State v Wilson, 
573 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Iowa 1998). 
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but would be allowed to prosecute an offense discovered the following day. See Wilson, 
573 N.W.2d at 253 (recognizing the absurdity of this result). 
This Court will '"interpret a statute to avoid absurd consequences.'" Brixen & 
Christopher Architects, P.C v. State, 2001 UT App. 210, f 17, 29 P.3d 650 (quoting State 
v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, U 12, 992 P.2d 986). Therefore, even if the statute could somehow 
be read to imply that an offense must be discovered after the expiration of the original 
expiration date, such an interpretation should be rejected because it produces an absurd 
result. See id. 
Defendant argued below that the State had sufficient time to file this case within 
the original limitations period. R. 41-42. However, that fact is irrelevant to the 
interpretation of section 76-1-303. The statute either applies when discovery occurs 
before the expiration of original limitations period, or it does not. 
In drafting section 76-1-303 to apply regardless of when the offense is discovered, 
the Legislature reasonably balanced the State's interest in prosecuting crime with a 
defendant's interest in avoiding prosecution on a stale charge. For example, when a 
fraud-based offense is discovered within one year of its commission, the State is required 
to commence a prosecution within the original two-year limitations period. See id. at § 
76-1-303 (1999). When a fraud-based offense is discovered more than one year after its 
commission, the State must commence a prosecution within one year of discovery, as 
long as the original limitations period is not extended more than three years. See id. 
Thus, a defendant is never required to defend against a fraud-based charge more than 
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three years after the onginal limitations period would have expired Moreover, when the 
State begins a prosecution for a fraud-based offense after the original limitations period 
expires, it must do so within a year of discovering the offense. Thus, the statute stnkes a 
reasonable balance between the State's and a defendant's interests. 
As the tnal court recognized, the plain language of section 76-1-303 does not 
require that discovery occur after the expiration of the onginal limitations penod R 87 
The tnal court therefore erred m holding that the statute was inapplicable in this case R 
87-88. 
B. The trial court erred by imposing upon section 76-1-303 
the requirement that discovery of the offense occur after 
the expiration of the original limitations period. 
Although the tnal court correctly held that the plain language of the statute did not 
require the State to discover the offense after the expiration of the onginal limitations 
penod, R. 87-88, it ruled that it could impose such a requirement. Id It stated, "[e]ven 
though section 303 may not, by its own terms, require the State to discover the offense 
after the expiration of the general limitation penod, the courts may impose a similar 
requirement " R. 87. When interpreting a statute, however, a court cannot "'infer 
substantive terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must 
be based on the language used, and [a court has] no power to rewnte the statute to 
conform to an intention not expressed.'" Associated Gen Contractors v Board of Oil 
Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, ^  30, 437 Utah Adv Rep. 35 (quoting Berrett v Purser & 
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Edwards, 876 P 2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994)) Thus, the tnal court erred by imposing a 
condition upon the statute that the plain language did not already require 
The tnal court erred because it imposed a requirement upon section 76-1-303 that 
the Legislature omitted from the statute, although this requirement is inherent in other 
judicially- and legislatively-created "discovery rules " The tnal court based its erroneous 
holding on dictum from O 'Neal v Division of Family Serv ,821 P 2d 1139,1144 (Utah 
1991), in which the Utah Supreme Court presumed that before any judicially- or even 
legislatively-created "discovery rule" could extend or toll a limitations period, a plaintiff 
would have to show that he or she did not know and could not reasonably ha\e known of 
the existence of a cause of action within the onginal limitations period R 87-88 
Although this dictum is generally correct when applied to judicially-created, and even 
most legislatively-created "discovery rules," it cannot be applied to section 76-1-303 
because, as discussed above, the Legislature intentionally omitted this requirement from 
the statute See Associated Gen Contractors, 2001 UT 112 at f^ 30 (holding that a court 
cannot impose a requirement upon a statute that is not there) The tnal court therefore 
erred in imposing this requirement upon section 76-1-303. 
A "discovery rule" is an exception to the general rule that "a cause of action 
accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action" 
and that "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent the 
running of the statute of limitations." Myers v McDonald, 635 P 2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981) 
There are three circumstances in which a "discovery rule" operates as an exception to this 
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general rule. Id. One circumstance is when the Legislature creates a "discovery rule" by 
statute. Id. The other two circumstances are judicially created, and apply when: (1) there 
is proof of concealment or misleading by the defendant; or (2) exceptional circumstances 
exist which would render application of the general rule irrational or unjust. Id. 
When applying the two judicially created "discovery rules," Utah courts have 
consistently held that neither rule applies unless a plaintiff can show that he or she did not 
know and could not reasonably have known of the existence of a cause of action within 
the original limitations period. See, e.g., Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Rees, 668 P.2d 1254, 
1257 (Utah 1983); Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Const Co., 744 P.2d 1370, 1374 
(Utah 1987); O'Neal, 821 P.2d at 1144; Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 
1129-31 (Utah 1992); Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1231 
(Utah 1995); Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Utah 1998); Maoris v. Sculptured 
Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43, fflj 16-18, 24 P.3d 984; Horn v. Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 
962 P.2d 95, 101-03 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
As the Utah Supreme Court observed in O Neal, a showing that a plaintiff did not 
know and could not have known of his cause of action within the original limitations 
period is inherent in the "concealment" and "exceptional circumstances" rules. 821 P.2d 
at 1144. Indeed, where a plaintiff discovered or should have discovered his cause of 
action within the original limitations period, no concealment has occurred and no 
exceptional circumstance would exist to justify extending the statute of limitations. 
11 
Because neither of these judicially created rules could exist without such a showing, the 
showing is a "definitional prerequisite" to these rules. Id. (emphasis added). 
Most statutory "discovery rules" also possess this same "definitional prerequisite." 
See id. For example, most statutes that create "discovery rules" state that the applicable 
statute of limitations does not even begin to run until the plaintiff discovers or should 
have discovered the cause of action. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-12-19 (action to 
set aside fraudulently sold estate); 78-12-26(1) (action for waste or trespass by 
underground works on a mining claim); 78-12-26(2) (loss of branded livestock that have 
strayed or been stolen); 78-12-26(3) (fraud); 78-12-27 (actions against corporate 
stockholders or directors); 78-14-4 (healthcare malpractice). Thus, the dictum in O 'Neal 
is correct to the extent that it refers to these legislatively-created "discovery rules." 
Indeed, under these statutes it would be definitionally impossible for a plaintiff to 
discover a cause of action before the original limitations period expired, because the 
limitations period does not even begin to run until the plaintiff actually discovers or 
should have discovered his cause of action. 
Section 76-1-303, however, is fundamentally different from the two judicially-
created "discovery rules," and the above-cited "discovery rules" that the Legislature has 
created for civil causes of actions. With both judicially-created "discovery rules," and the 
legislatively-created "discovery rules" cited above, "'the limitations period does not begin 
to run until the discovery of facts forming the basis of the cause of action.'" O 'Neal, 821 
P.2d at 1143 (quoting Myers, 635 P.2d at 86). The limitations period for criminal 
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offenses, however, always beings to run from the commission of the crime. UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-1-302 (1999). Nevertheless, section 76-1-303 allows for a limited extension of 
the limitations period when the offense involves fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. See id. 
§76-1-303. 
As discussed above, the Legislature apparently recognized the unfairness of 
forcing a criminal defendant to defend against a fraud-based charge more than three years 
after the original limitations period had expired. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-303(2). 
The Legislature also apparently recognized the unfairness and the absurd result that 
would occur if the State were prevented from prosecuting a fraud-based offense that was 
discovered within the original limitations period, but not in time to allow for adequate 
investigation and screening. See id. § 76-1-303(1). Thus, the Legislature drafted section 
76-1-303 to avoid this absurd result, but still place a maximum limit on the extension of 
the original limitations period. See id. 
While courts can modify and define the scope of the judicially-created "discovery 
rules," they cannot modify or redefine the scope of a legislatively-created "discovery 
rule." See Associated Gen. Contractors, 2001 UT 112 at |^ 30 (stating that courts cannot 
infer substantive terms into statutes). The requirement that a plaintiff discover his or her 
cause of action after the expiration of the original statute of limitations is a "definitional 
prerequisite" to the judicially created "concealment" and "exceptional circumstances" 
rules, and also to many of the legislatively-created "discovery rules." O 'Neal, 821 P.2d at 
13 
1144 The Legislature excluded this requirement from section 76-1-303, however Thus, 
the trial court erred when it imposed this additional requirement upon the statute 
C. The State Timely Filed the Information in This Case. 
Applying the three-prong test of section 76-1-303(1), the State timely filed the 
information in this case 1. The information charged that the crime occurred between 12 
February, and 30 March 1999 R. 2. The onginal limitations penod therefore expired on 
30 March 2001. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-302(b) (1999). The information was not 
filed until 16 Apnl 2001. R. 1-2. Thus, "the penod prescnbed in Section 76-1-302 [had] 
expired." UTAH CODE ANN § 76-1-303(1) (1999). 
2. However, the information also charged that defendant "executed one or more 
notanal certificates known by her to be false; or performed a notanal act with intent to 
deceive or defraud." R. 2. Therefore, fraud was a matenal element of the offense See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-303(1) (1999). 
3. Furthermore, the State discovered the offense on 30 June 2000, when an 
investigator from the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing began 
investigating the crime by interviewing two of the signatories of the deeds R 19, 29-30 
The information was filed on 16 Apnl 2001. R. 1. Therefore, the "prosecution [was] 
commenced . . . within one year after discovery of the offense by an aggneved party or by 
a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggneved party and who is himself not a 
party to the offense." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-303(1) (1999). 
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Finally, the prosecution was commenced two years and seventeen days after the 
crime was committed. R. 1-2. Thus, application of section 76-1-303 did not extend the 
original two-year limitations period beyond the three year maximum. See UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-1-303(2) (1999). The information was therefore timely filed, and the trial 
court erred in dismissing this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order of dismissal should be reversed and the case remanded for 
further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this Av day of January, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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46-1-9. False or incomplete certificate. 
A notary may not: 
(1) execute a certificate containing a statement known by the notary to be false or 
materially incomplete; or 
(2) perform any notarial act with intent to deceive or defraud. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-1-9 (1998). 
76-1-302. Time limitations for prosecution of offenses - Commencement of 
prosecution. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for: 
(a) a felony or negligent homicide shall be commenced within four years after it is 
committed; 
(b) a misdemeanor other than negligent homicide shall be commenced within two 
years after it is committed; and 
(c) any infraction shall be commenced within one year after it is committed. 
(2) A prosecution is commenced upon the finding and filing of an indictment by a grand 
jury or upon the filing of a complaint or information. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-302 (1999). 
76-1-303. Time limitations for fraud or breach of fiduciary obligation and 
misconduct of public officer or employee. 
(1) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-302 has expired, a prosecution may be 
commenced for any offense a material element of which is either fraud or a breach of 
fiduciary obligation within one year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party 
or by a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and who is himself not 
a party to the offense. 
(2) Subsection (1) may not extend the period of limitation as provided in Section 
76-1-302 by more than three years. 
(3) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-301.5 or 76-1-302 has expired, a prosecution 
may be commenced for: 
(a) any offense based upon misconduct in office by a public officer or public 
employee: 
(i) at any time during which the defendant holds a public office or during the 
period of his public employment; or 
(ii) within two years after termination of defendant's public office or public 
employment. 
(b) Except as provided in Section 76-1-301.5, Subsection (3) shall not extend the 
period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than three years. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-303 (1999). 
Addendum B 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARIE S. McKINNON, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 9£iift$56i*M06 
HON. BEN H. HADFIELD 
The parties submit the case for decision on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
with Prejudice. Defendant argues that the Information was filed beyond the two year 
statute of limitations and that the discovery rule of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-303 is 
inapplicable. The State argues that both the fraud and the misconduct in office portions 
of section 303fs discovery rule apply. 
Section 303(1), the discovery rule for fraud, provides: 
(1) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-302 has expired, a 
prosecution may be commenced for any offense a material element 
of which is either fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation within 
one year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party or by 
a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and 
who is himself not a party to the offense. 
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Section 303(3), the discovery rule for misconduct in officer provides: 
(3) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-301.5 or 76-1-302 has 
expired, a prosecution may be commenced for: 
(a) any offense based upon misconduct in office by a public officer 
or public employee: 
(i) at any time during which the defendant holds a public office or 
during the period of his public employment; or 
(ii) within two years after termination of defendant's public office 
or public employee 
Both sections contain the introductory clause "if the period prescribed in [the applicable 
general limitation statute] has expired." Defendant argues that the phrase has no 
meaning unless it means that the discovery rule of section 303 applies only if the State 
first learns of the offense after the statute of limitations has run. 
The court can conceive of one other circumstance where the phrase would 
have meaning. If the Defendant had committed the offense less than a year before the 
State learned of the offense, section 303, without the introductory and limiting phrase 
quoted above, would decrease the two year period of the general statute. For example, 
say that the Defendant committed the offense on 1 July 1999 and the state learned of the 
offense on 1 August 1999. If the statute read: 
3 
(1) If the period prescribed in Section 76" 1-3 02 has expired, A 
prosecution may be commenced for any offense a material element 
of which is either fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation within 
one year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party or by 
a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and 
who is himself not a party to the offense, 
then the Defendant could argue that the limitation period was one year from 1 August 
1999, effectively cutting the limitation period in half— an absurd result. The legislature 
may have wanted to avoid that absurd result when it included the limiting introductory 
clause in 303(1) and (3). The Defendant's argument that the phrase can only have 
meaning ~ that the State must discover the cause of action after the general statute of 
limitation has run — fails, and the court will not rule that the language of section 303 
requires that result. 
Even though section 303 may not, by its own terms, require the State to 
discover the offense after the expiration of the general limitation period, the courts may 
impose a similar requirement. Defendant cites numerous civil cases which invoke the 
requirement. The State argues that none of those cases involve a legislatively created 
discovery rule as this one does. But the state cannot point to a case involving a statute 
where the requirement is rejected. The parties agree that dicta in O 'Neal v. Division of 
4 
Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Utah 1991) seems to apply the requirement in 
all cases whether the discovery rule is legislated or judicially created. Without 
additional guidance from the appellate courts, this court finds the dicta in O'Neal 
persuasive and will follow the dicta from O 'Neal in holding that, for the discovery rule 
of section 303 to apply, the state must have discovered the action after the general statue 
of limitations has run. 
The Defendant's motion is granted; Defendant's counsel shall prepare the 
order. 
Dated this ^H day of August 2001. 
